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BANNING THE TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR WASTE:
A PERMISSIBLE EXERCISE OF THE STATES'
POLICE POWER?
INTRODUCTION

In April 1977, President Carter declared a nationwide ban on the
commercial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.' As a result, the spent
fuel began to accumulate in storage pools at the various nuclear power
plants. 2 These pools, however, were not designed for long-term storage, 3 and their capacity is limited. 4 Unless a means of permanently
disposing of this waste is found, 5 nuclear power plants will be forced
to shut down, some as early as the mid-1980's. 6
Responding to this urgent need, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 7 which establishes a schedule for the
development and construction of permanent nuclear waste disposal

1. Statement by the President on His Decisions Following a Review of U.S.
Policy, 1977 Pub. Papers 587-88. This decision resulted from a concern that nuclear
materials made available through the wide-spread use of nuclear technology might
be used for nuclear weapons. "[T]he serious consequences of proliferation and direct
implications for peace and security" required this change in the nation's nuclear
energy policy. Id. at 587. Even prior to this decision, economic problems were
preventing spent fuel reprocessing from becoming a viable industry in the United
States. H.R. Rep. No. 491, pt. 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3792, 3793.
2. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1717 (1983); see H.R. Rep. No. 491, pt. 1, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 28, reprintedin 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3792, 3794.
3. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1717 (1983); H.R. Rep. No. 491, pt. 1, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 27-28, reprintedin 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3792, 3794.
4. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1717 (1983); In re Duke Power Co., 14 N.R.C. 307, 314
(1981).
5. Technically, spent nuclear fuel is different from "high-level radioactive
waste." Spent nuclear fuel is the nuclear material removed from a reactor before the
reusable elements of the spent fuel have been separated by reprocessing. Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, § 2, 96 Stat. 2201, 2204 (1983)
(current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 10101(23) (West 1983)). "High-level radioactive
waste" includes the unusable material remaining after the reprocessing and any other
highly radioactive material that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines
needs permanent isolation. Id., 96 Stat. at 2203 (current version at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 10101(12) (West 1983)).
6. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1717-18 (1983); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F.
Supp. 440, 448 (E.D. Va. 1981); see Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206,'208
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983); H.R. Rep. No. 785, pt. 1, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1982).
7. Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 10101-10226 (West 1983)).
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facilities. 8 The schedule calls for these facilities to be operational by

the year 2000.1 In most cases, these facilities will be located away
from the sites of the power plants.l0 Consequently, the nation's road-

ways will be used to transport the nuclear waste. Although nuclear
waste has been, and is being, shipped to other power plants with
more frequent
available storage space," the shipments will become
12
when the disposal facilities become operational.
Some states facing such an increase in the transportation of nuclear
waste have initiated actions to prohibit all highway transportation of
nuclear waste,13 claiming that the transportation endangers the public

8. H.R. Rep. No. 491, pt. 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31, reprintedin 1982 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3792, 3797.
9. Id., reprintedin 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3797.
10. See id. at 32-34, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 37983800; id. at 38, reprintedin 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3804 (difficulties
in increasing "at-reactor storage" include economic and regulatory impediments).
The design requirements of the disposal facilities also deter construction at the site of
the power plants. The surface facilities alone will cover 400 acres of land. Id. at 34,
reprintedin 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3800. The underground repository
tunnels will cover 2,000 acres of rock. Id. at 32, reprintedin 1982 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 3798.
11. See, e.g., Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 208 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983); N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1983, at A18, col. 1.
12. Winchester, Wheeling and Dealing in Nuclear Power (Book Review), 68

Sierra 75, 75 (Sept./Oct. 1983).
13. The attorneys general of both Illinois and Ohio have already gone to court in
an attempt to block the shipments of nuclear waste. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1983, at 46,
col. 1. Alaska forbids all transportation of high-level nuclear waste, unless the
purpose of the transportation is to take the waste out of the state for disposal. Alaska
Stat. § 18.45.027 (1981). This statute technically would allow a shipper to pass
through the state, provided the terminus of the journey was out of the state. Because
of Alaska's geographic position, however, the effect of the statute is to prohibit any
out-of-state shipments from entering the state, while permitting the state to transport
its own waste out. Such a discriminatory impact may violate the commerce clause.
See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text. Other states have statutes allowing
state officials to deny a permit for the transportation of nuclear waste based on public
health and safety reasons. Enforcement procedures include injunctions, fines, or
embargos. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-672(A), -673, -685, -687 (West Supp.
1983-1984) (injunction and misdemeanor); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-11-103(2), -104(1),
-106, -107 (1973 & Supp. 1983) (injunction, fine, and imprisonment); Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 16a-106 (1983) (maximum fine of $10,000); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 7413,
7414 (1983) (injunction); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 31-13-2, -13-5(a)(7), -13-10, -13-15
(1982) (misdemeanor); Idaho Code §§ 39-3006(3), -3012, -3013, -3017 (1977 & Supp.
1983) (injunction and misdemeanor); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 48-1606, -1607, -1610 to 1613 (1983) (impounding, injunction, fine, and imprisonment); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§
174.400-174.990 (1980) (fine); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111, § 5B (Michie/Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1983) (fine); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 45-14-53, -57, -69 (Supp. 1983) (fine and
imprisonment); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 75-3-202, -404, -405 (1983) (fine and imprisonment); N.J. Stats. Ann. §§ 26:2D-10, -11.1, -13, -18 (West 1964 & Supp. 1983-1984)
(embargo, injunction, and damages); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 469.530(2), -. 550(2), -.570,
-.603, -.605 (1981) (injunction). These statutes, which provide for selective enforce-
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health and safety. 14 Such state action certainly will hamper the
growth of the nuclear industry in this country. A nuclear power plant
within the state would be forced, when its storage space filled up, to
ship its waste by other means, such as by rail or waterway. If these
other means were not available, the accumulation of waste would
eventually force the plant to shut down. 15
In a recently publicized case,1" New York City attempted to justify
its ban on the transportation of nuclear waste by claiming that the
federal regulations controlling such transportation did not provide for
the highest possible level of safety.' 7 In a split decision, the Second
Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the regulations did not
have to ensure an optimum level of safety.' This does not mean,
however, that New York City and other state and local governments
will be precluded from enacting and enforcing such bans. 19 It does
mean that, rather than attempting to defeat the adequacy of the
federal regulations, these bans will have to survive scrutiny under the
supremacy and commerce clauses. The supremacy clause establishes
20
the superior authority of federal legislation over state legislation.
The commerce clause grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the states. 21 Under this clause, state action will be
declared invalid
if it erects a barrier to the free flow of interstate
22
commerce.

ment by state officials, may be an impermissible regulation of a radiation hazard.
They allow the states to determine what type of technical safety measures are
acceptable, thus infringing on the NRC's authority over such technical matters. See
infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
15. In re Duke Power Co., 14 N.R.C. 307, 314-15 (1981). There are four options
available to the plant operator when his storage pools fill: 1) expand the storage pool,
2) build an on-site storage facility, 3) transport the fuel to another location, 4) shut
down. Id. The first three of these options may not actually exist. It may not be
possible to expand the pools, and there may be timing and economic difficulties in
constructing an on-site storage facility. Id. at 315. Therefore, if the transportation of
the waste is banned, the only "option" remaining to the plant operator would be to
shut down.
16. City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir.
1983), dismissedfor lack of jurisdiction, 52 U.S.L.W. 3630 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1984).
17. Id. at 739.
18. Id. at 740.
19. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. A local municipality, however, might have more difficulty in enacting such a ban. See infra note 164.
20. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, states that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
21. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, provides that Congress shall have the authority
to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."
22. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535-38 (1949); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
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This Note analyzes whether, under the supremacy and commerce
clauses, a state has the authority to impose a ban on the highway
transportation of nuclear waste within its borders.2 3 The supremacy
clause analysis in Part I examines whether Congress has completely
occupied the field of the regulation of radiation hazards. If so, a state
ban would be an impermissible attempt to regulate in a field preempted by Congress. The commerce clause analysis in Part II asks
whether such a ban erects an impermissible barrier to the free flow of
interstate commerce. This Note concludes that the federal nuclear
legislation has not clearly and unambiguously preempted the states'
authority to impose a total ban on all nuclear waste transportation.
Furthermore, under current commerce clause analysis a non-discriminatory ban that achieves some tangible safety benefit would not be
considered an impermissible burden on commerce. If the states' authority in this area is to be removed, it must be done by the affirmative action of Congress.
I.

PREEMPTION UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE

A state ban on the transportation of nuclear waste raises the question whether such regulations are preempted by federal legislation,
specifically the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,24 the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act, 25 and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act.26 The

preemption doctrine arises out of the supremacy clause of the Constitution. State legislation is preempted if Congress has already enacted
27
valid federal legislation covering the same area.

174 (1941); The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 400 (1913); Leisy.v. Hardin,
135 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1890); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on
Constitutional Law 268 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as J. Nowak]; L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law § 6-4, at 325 (1978); Trosten & Ancarrow, FederalState-Local Relationships in TransportingRadioactive Materials: Rules of the Nuclear Road, 68 Ky. L.J. 251, 253 (1979-1980).
23. While most of the arguments in this Note apply to local as well as state
authority, for the sake of simplicity this Note will only make references to the states.
On the local level, there is the added complication of whether state action has
preempted the local authority. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25653 (West
1967) (no state agency, city, county or other political subdivision shall adopt regulations regarding the transportation of nuclear waste inconsistent with those adopted
by the State Department of Health); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16a-107 (1983) (authority of
commissioner over transportation of nuclear materials supersedes any municipal
ordinance).
24. Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 20112296 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
25. Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 10,101-10,226 (West 1983)).
26. Pub. L. No. 93-633, 88 Stat. 2156 (1975) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1812 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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If the state action falls within the police power of the state, however, courts will not readily find that Congress has preempted the
entire area of regulation. 2 The term "police power" refers to the
inherent authority of the state to pass laws protecting the "health,
safety, morals or general welfare" of the public. 29 When states legislate within this traditional authority, courts presume that the act is
valid. 30 This presumption will not be defeated unless it is shown that
the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" was to preempt the
states' authority. 31 Even if some amount of federal preemption is
found, the states' police power is not considered totally preempted,
but is invalidated only "to the extent that it clearly has been preempted. "32
Courts look at various factors to find a clear congressional intent to
preempt. First, Congress may expressly preclude state authority to
regulate a particular field. 33 Second, a state law may be deemed
28. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); J. Nowak, supra note 22, at 294; L. Tribe,
supra note 22, § 6-25, at 385.
29. J. Nowak, supra note 22, at 429; see Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761, 764 (1945); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); Hannibal & St. J. R.R.
Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877); B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law § 2.5, at 54
(2d ed. 1979).
30. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766-67 (1945); J. Nowak, supra note 22,
at 295; L. Tribe, supra note 22, § 6-25, at 385. This judicial deference is even more
pronounced if the regulation specifically promotes the public health and safety.
Huron Portland Cement Co., 362 U.S. at 442-43; Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem.
Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 578 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 469 (1982).
31. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1963)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); accord Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S.Ct.
1713, 1723 (1983); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357
(1976); New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973);
see J. Nowak, supra note 22, at 295; L. Tribe, supra note 22, § 6-25, at 385;
Henderson, The Nuclear Choice: Are Health and Safety Issues Pre-empted?, 8 B.C.
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 821, 842-43 (1980).
32. Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 579 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S.Ct. 469 (1982); see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1726 (1983) (court must determine
whether the federal government "completely occupies a given field or an identifiable
portion of it"); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947) ("It is
often a perplexing question whether Congress has precluded state action or by the
choice of selective regulatory measures has left the police power of the States undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations collide."); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 132 (1913) (state law must yield to the extent that it interferes with
federal legislation); L. Tribe, supra note 22, § 6-25, at 384-85 (total'preemption is
not inferred in absence of clear congressional intent to bar state action).
33. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
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invalid if it conflicts with a federal law in such a way as to make
compliance with both a physical impossibility. 34 Third, a congression-

al intent to preempt may be inferred from a variety of factors, including the legislative history of the federal statute, 35 the pervasiveness of
the federal occupation of the field, 3 or the existence of badominant
federal interest, 37 such as a need for national uniformity. 38 Finally, a
state law may be invalid if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. ' 39
The federal statutes regulating the nuclear industry must be examined in the light of the above factors. If Congress has expressed an
unambiguous intention to preempt states from banning the transportation of nuclear waste, any state action in this area is invalid.
A. The Atomic Energy Act
1. Express Preemption
The primary purpose of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA)4 ° 4is
of nuclear energy as a power source. 1

to foster the safe development
The original AEA was virtually silent on whether a state may regulate

(1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 234 (1947); Northern States
Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1971), affd mem., 405 U.S.
1035 (1972); 2 C. Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law § 10:22, at 43 (1969); J.
Nowak, supra note 22, at 292.
34. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963);
accord Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); L. Tribe, supra note 22, § 6-24, at 377-78; see 2 C.
Antieau, supra note 33, § 10:22, at 40.
35. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-50 (1963);
Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 579 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 469 (1982); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th
Cir. 1971), aJJ'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
36. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)).
37. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-44 (1963).
38. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945); The Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1890);
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 318, 340, 12 How. 299, 319 (1851).
39. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); accord Fidelity Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
40. Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 20112296 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
41. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1731 (1983); id. at 1735 (Blackmun, J., concurring); H.R.
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radiation sources for health and safety reasons. 42 In 1959, Congress
passed an amendment attempting "to clarify the ... responsibilities
...of the States. '43 Despite this attempt at clarification, the AEA still
fails to state expressly that the federal government has sole and exclusive authority to regulate radiation hazards. 44 Thus, there is no express
preemption of the states' police power.
2. Physical Impossibility
A state ban on nuclear waste transportation would not be invalid on
the basis that compliance with both the federal and the state regulations is physically impossible. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) 45 is authorized under the AEA to license the transfer in inter' 47
'4
state commerce of "special nuclear material, ' "source material ,"
and "byproduct materials,' 48 to regulate the export and import of
Rep. No. 883, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965); see 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976); H.R. Rep.
No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1954).
42. Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, Selected Materials on Federal-State Cooperation in the Atomic Energy Field 1, 3-4 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Federal-State
Cooperation]. The 1954 AEA was not totally silent on this point, however. See infra
notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1) (1976). See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
44. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir.
1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); Henderson, supra note 31, at 844; Meek,
Nuclear Power and State Radiation ProtectionMeasures: The Impotence of Preemption, 10 Envtl. L. 1, 11 (1979).
45. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was abolished in 1974, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 5814 (1976), and was replaced in its regulatory capacity by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, id. § 5841. Throughout this Note, "NRC" will refer to both Commissions.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2073(a) (1976). "Special nuclear material" is defined as:
(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235,
and any other material which the Commission ... determines to be special
nuclear material, but does not include source material; or (2) any material
artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include source
material.
Id. § 2014(aa).
47. Id. § 2092 (1976). "Source material" is defined as:
(1) uranium, thorium, or any other material which is determined by the
Commission ... to be source material; or (2) ores containing one or more of
the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the Commission may by
regulation determine from time to time.

Id. § 2014(z).
48. Id. § 2111 (Supp. V 1981). "Byproduct materials" are defined as:
(1) any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or
made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of
producing or utilizing special nuclear material, and (2) the tailings or wastes
produced by the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from
any ore processed primarily for its source material content.
Id. § 2014(e).
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these materials into the United States, 49 and to regulate the disposal of
these materials. 50 No express provision, however, exists in the AEA
permitting the NRC to require the transportation of nuclear waste. 5'
Thus, a state ban on such transportation would not make it physically
impossible for a third party to comply with federal regulations.5 2 The
NRC regulations merely dictate how shipments of nuclear waste
should be carried out if these shipments occur.5 3 Because the federal
regulations do not demand such shipments, a state ban forbidding the
transport of the waste does not force the possessor of nuclear waste
into a physically impossible situation.

49. Id. § 2021(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
50. Id.
51. Cf. Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 583 & n.22 (7th Cir.)
(NRC asserted that it could not require clean-up of off-site dumps of radioactive
byproduct materials, but that any action taken with regard to such dumps must be
done under a license from the NRC), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 469 (1982); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (NRC authorized to require that no transfer of
possession or control of nuclear material shall take place except pursuant to a license
issued by the NRC). Thus, the NRC can both prevent the transportation of nuclear
waste and license those who do transport the waste, but it cannot force such transportation to take place.
52. Similarly, the AEA does not require the states to authorize the construction of
nuclear power plants. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983). The Supreme Court has made
contradictory statements as to whether a state's prohibition of the construction of
such plants in the face of an NRC license would make compliance with federal
regulations a physical impossibility. Compare id. at 1722 (dictum) (AEA does not
prohibit states from deciding to forbid the construction of nuclear reactors) and id. at
1734 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (even if the NRC decides it is safe to proceed with
construction of nuclear power plants, states are not obligated to do so) with id. at
1727 (dictum) (state refusal to permit construction of nuclear plants because of safety
concerns would conflict directly with the NRC judgment that nuclear technology is
safe). The Court's latter assertion, however, may not be directed so much towards
physical impossibility as to the perceived completeness of the federal occupation of
the field of nuclear safety. See id. at 1726 (dictum) (federal government occupies the
whole field of nuclear safety concerns, "except the limited powers expressly ceded to
the states"). Recently, the Court retreated from its belief that Congress occupied the
entire field of nuclear safety concerns. See infra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
A federal permit to engage in an action, such as the construction of a nuclear facility
or the transportation of nuclear waste, is not a federal order to do so. Marshall v.
Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 259, 237 N.W.2d 266, 280 (1975); see In
re Consolidated Edison Co., 7 N.R.C. 31, 34 (1978) (state retains the right to
preclude construction even in the face of an issuance of an NRC permit). Because the
NRC license merely permits construction of a nuclear facility or transportation of
nuclear waste, a state measure forbidding those actions would not result in a physically impossible situation.
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (NRC authorized to require
that no transfer of possession or control of nuclear materials shall take place except
pursuant to a license issued by the NRC).
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3. Implied Preemption
Courts look at various factors in attempting to find an implicit
preemption within a federal statute-4 These factors include the legislative history of the statute, the pervasiveness of the federal occupation of the field, and the need for national uniformity in the regulations. 55
The Supreme Court has examined the legislative history of the AEA
in an effort to determine the extent of implied preemption in the field
of nuclear energy. 6 Although Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State

Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission 7 dealt

chiefly with a state's authority to impose economic regulations,5 8 the
Court, in dictum, discussed a state's authority to enact regulations to
protect against radiation hazards. 59 Unfortunately, the discussion is
somewhat contradictory.6 0 At one point, the Court found congression-

al intent to preempt the states only as to the regulation of "the
radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation
of a nuclear plant.""' Later, however, the Court claimed that "the
federal government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety
6' 2
concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the states."

54. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
56. The earliest federal case dealing directly with the extent of federal preemption in the nuclear field was Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143,
1145 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). The Eighth Circuit concluded that the NRC had the "sole authority to regulate radiation hazards associated
with by-product, source, and special nuclear materials and with production and
utilization facilities." Id. at 1149. This decision has been criticized by some authors.
See, e.g., Jaksetic, Constitutional Dimensions of State Efforts to Regulate Nuclear
Waste, 32 S.C.L. Rev. 789, 819-20 (1981) (stating that Northern States should be
limited to its facts); Meek, Nuclear Power and State RadiationProtection Measures:
The Impotence of Preemption, 10 Envtl. L. 1, 13-16 (1979) ("The wisdom of perpetuating the dubious logic of Northern States [may] be seriously questioned."); Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the Burger Court: California'sNuclear Law as a
Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C.D. L. Rev. 3, 72-74 (1979) (NorthernStates analysis
is no longer an acceptable test for preemption). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
indicated some disagreement with the reasoning employed in Northern States. See
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
103 S.Ct. 1713, 1726 n.24 (1983) (summary affirmance in Northern States is not an
adoption of the reasoning used by the lower court).
57. 103 S.Ct. 1713 (1983).
58. Id. at 1727-28.
59. Id. at 1722-23, 1726-27.
60. Id. at 1732-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 1723.
62. Id. at 1726.
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Thus, Pacific provides no definitive conclusion as to3 whether the
federal preemption in this field is partial or absolute.6

In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,64 the Court again attempted to
clarify the preemption issue. The question confronting the Court was
whether the AEA preempted a state-authorized award of punitive
damages.6 5 The Court recognized that punitive damages are "regulatory in the sense that a nuclear plant will be threatened with damages
liability if it does not conform to state standards." ' It then reiterated
its statement in Pacific that the NRC has authority to regulate the

construction and operation of nuclear facilities,6 7 and on that basis
concluded that the federal government has occupied the whole field of
nuclear safety concerns.6 8 Having reached this conclusion, however,
the Court then stated that the defendant failed to show that Congress

intended to disallow punitive damages.69 As a result, the Court upheld

the plaintiffs right to receive punitive damages. 70 Thus, the Court

contradicted itself by stating that Congress had occupied the whole
field of nuclear safety regulations and then permitting state regulation

in the form of punitive damages. 71 The result is that a definite view as
to the extent of federal preemption does not exist.

63. The narrower "construction and operation" view has some support from
Congress. See H.R. Rep. No. 567, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1965) (NRC's regulatory
control is limited to protecting the public health and safety with respect to the special
hazards associated with the operation of nuclear facilities).
64. 52 U.S.L.W. 4043 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984).
65. Id. at 4044.
66. Id. at 4048. Compensatory damages, however, would not be regulatory in
that they seek to make the injured party whole, rather than to punish the wrongdoer.
Id. at 4050 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 4046.
68.' Id.
69. Id. at 4048. The Court found that Congress assumed that traditional state
tort liability would apply unless expressly preempted. Hence, the defendant had to
show that Congress did not intend to allow punitive damages. Id. Similarly, the
states' authority to ban the transportation of nuclear waste must be shown to be
clearly preempted before state action is deemed invalid, because the states' police
power is presumed not to be preempted unless that was the manifest intention of
Congress. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
70. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4049. While holding that the AEA did not preempt a
punitive damages award, the Court remanded the case so that the defendant could
reassert any claims made before the Court of Appeals that had not been addressed by
either that court or the Supreme Court. Id. These claims included the defendant's
contention that the award was not supported by sufficient evidence and that it was
excessive. Id.
71. Id. at 4049 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). By requiring the defendant to show
that Congress intended to supplant state punitive damages awarls, the Court has
retreated from its dictum in Pacific that Congress had totally preempted the field of
nuclear safety "except the limited powers expressly ceded to the states." Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S.Ct. 1713,
1726 (1983).
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In light of the Supreme Court's failure to reach a definite conclusion
as to congressional intent, an examination of the legislative history of

the AEA is necessary. A close reading of the history of the 1959
amendment to the AEA, which was intended to clarify the federalstate relationship in the nuclear field, 72 shows some ambiguity as to
whether Congress e-ver intended the federal preemption to be absolute.
Early versions of the amendment demonstrate that the extent of the
states' authority in the area of nuclear safety was one of the foremost
concerns of Congress in passing that amendment. An earlier proposed
bill, for example, suggested that the states be permitted to promulgate
73
standards that were more stringent than those adopted by the NRC.
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1) (1976); S.Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 8,
reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2872, 2878. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
73. AEC Proposed Bill in June 1957, reprinted in Federal-State Cooperation,
supra note 42, at 18. The bill stated in part:
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent the States from adopting,
inspecting against, and enforcing standards, not in conflict with those
adopted by the Commission, for protecting the health and safety of the
public from radiation hazards incident to the processing and utilization of
source, byproduct, and special nuclear material.
Id. The phrase "not in conflict" meant that a state could not relieve anybody from
complying with the NRC's standards, but could impose more stringent state standards. Atomic Energy Commission Analysis of Proposed 1957 Bill, reprinted in
Federal-State Cooperation, supra note 42, at 22.
In 1959, the NRC proposed another bill, see Federal-State Cooperation, supra note
42, at 24 (reprinting letter from A.R. Luedecke to Chairman Anderson of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy), which was very similar to the present 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 274(a)(1) of that earlier proposal provided
that "during the duration of. . .an agreement, nothing in this Act shall be construed
to affect the authority of the State to regulate and license the categories of activities
covered by the agreement for the protection of the health and safety of the public
from radiation hazards." AEC Proposed Bill in March 1959, reprinted in FederalState Cooperation, supra note 42, at 27 (emphasis added). This statement was
designed to clarify that, once a state had entered into an agreement with the NRC for
the discontinuance of NRC regulatory authority over certain areas, the state would
then have "full jurisdiction with respect to regulation of those activities for protection
against radiation hazards." Id. at 29; 105 Cong. Rec. 8384 (1959) (reprinting letter
from A.R. Luedecke, General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission, to Senator
Anderson, Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (May 13, 1959)). The use
of the term "full jurisdiction" in connection with a statement that the AEA would not
"'affect the authority" of an agreement state suggests that, prior to the agreement, the
state's authority was partial, and only became "full" after the state had entered into
the agreement.
The present 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) changes the language of the
earlier proposal. Section 2021(b) states in part that "[d]uring the duration of such an
agreement. . .the State shall have authority to regulate the materials covered by the
agreement for the protection of the public health and safety from radiation hazards."
Id. § 2021(b) (1976) (emphasis added). This suggests a more comprehensive preemption by the federal government. Instead of the AEA ceasing to "affect the authority"

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

At a later date, an express preemption clause was suggested.74 None-

theless, Congress failed to act on either proposal. 75 While this does not
prove that Congress intended to leave any authority with the states, it

is fair to conclude that Congress was unwilling to commit itself to a
firm stance.
Furthermore, the language of the AEA suggests that the states have
some authority to promulgate standards for protecting against radiation hazards. Section 2021(g) states that the NRC is to cooperate with
the states to "assure that State and Commission programs for protection against hazards of radiation will be coordinated and compatible. 76 The NRC analysis of this subsection states that this cooperation
becomes "even more important" when the states enter into an agreement with the NRC to assume independent regulatory responsibilities
in the areas presently within the authority of the NRC. 77 Section
2021(g), therefore, must contemplate some cooperation between the
NRC and the state before the state enters such an agreement. It is
when the state has entered this agreement that the cooperation becomes "even more important," that is, more important than the need
for cooperation before the agreement. Yet if some cooperation is
anticipated before the state enters into an agreement with the NRC,
arguably the AEA contemplates some state regulatory authority.

of the agreement state, the regulatory authority is now affirmatively granted to the
agreement state, apparently for only the duration of the agreement.
Thus, the history of the 1959 amendment clearly shows that Congress was seriously
considering the extent of state authority under the AEA. Such consideration, however, does not, of itself, automatically imply total preemption. See supra notes 30-32
and accompanying text.
74. Hearingsbefore the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy on Federal-StateRelationships in the Atomic Energy Field, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 307 (1959) (statement of
Mr. Toll) [hereinafter cited as 1959 Hearings]. At first, this suggestion was rejected,
mainly because it was "practically impossible" to decide when the preemption should
begin and end, and thus it was "better to leave these. . . questions perhaps up to the
courts later to be resolved." Id. at 307-08 (statement of Mr. Lowenstein). Subsequent
to this statement, an express preemption provision was incorporated into the amendment. Id. at 488. A few months later, it was deleted so as "to leave room for the
courts to determine the applicability of particular State laws and regulations dealing
with matters on the fringe of the preempted area in the light of all the provisions and
purposes of the Atomic Energy Act, rather than in light of a single sentence." Letter
from A.R. Luedecke to Chairman Anderson of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy (August 26, 1959), reprintedin 1959 Hearings, at 500. It is precisely this type
of hazy boundary that does not comply with the requirement of a clear and unambiguous indication of congressional intent to preempt. Tribe, California Declines the
Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a State Choice Preempted?, 7 Ecology L.Q. 679, 697
(1979). See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(g) (1976).
77. 105 Cong. Rec. 8385 (1959); see AEC Proposed Bill in March 1959, reprinted
in Federal-State Cooperation, supra note 42, at 33 (comment to subsection f).
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The comments to section 2021(k) ,78 however, seem to indicate a
congressional intent to occupy the area totally. The legislative history
states that the NRC has "exclusive authority to regulate for protection
against radiation hazards" until the states enter into a section 2021
agreement with the NRC to assume the responsibility. 79 The co-existence of sections 2021(g) and (k) reflects congressional confusion as to
the intended extent of the federal preemption. This uncertainty fails
to satisfy the requirement of a clear and unambiguous expression of an
intent to preempt the police power of the state. s0

In addition, the "exclusive authority" mentioned in the legislative
history to section 2021(k) may have been intended to extend only to
the technological concerns involved in protecting against radiation
hazards. As mentioned earlier, safety was not a dominant issue in the
1954 AEA. 81 However, the few comments about safety in the legislative history indicate a concern not with who regulates radiation in
general, but with who has the authority to issue technical regulations
for protecting against radiation hazards. For example, the principal

author of the AEA stated that the NRC's function is limited "to those
areas in which the Commission [has] special competence or responsi83
bility. '82 This includes consideration of designs for nuclear facilities,

the technical qualifications of nuclear plant operators,8 4 and the
health and safety standards to be used. 5 These comments demonstrate
a concern with the technical aspects of the field. There is certainly no
reason to suppose that the NRC has "special competence" as to non-

technical matters."6 Also, when questioned about the safeguarding of

78. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976) provides: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for
purposes other than protection against radiation hazards."
79. S.Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprintedin 1959 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2872, 2883.
80. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. See New Hampshire v. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170, 174 n.4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
Even a casual reading of the legislative history of the AEA shows that the dominant
concerns of Congress were the questions of monopolies, see, e.g., 100 Cong. Rec.
11,877-78, 11,903-07 (1954), patents, see, e.g, 100 Cong. Rec. 11,366-69, 11,721-29,
14,344-47 (1954), and the authority of the NRC to produce electricity for commercial
use, see, e.g., 100 Cong. Rec. 10,834-40, 11,221-28, 11,385-87 (1954).
82. 100 Cong. Rec. 10,559 (1954) (statement of Sen. Anderson, quoting Chairman Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission); see New Hampshire v. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170, 174 (1st Cir.) (Congress, in passing the 1954 legislation, was concerned with the "special hazards of radioactivity."), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 962 (1969).
83. 100 Cong. Rec. 10,559 (1954).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Cf. id. ("The Commission has no special competence in the field of electric
energy distribution and seeks no responsibility in that field. Its functions should be
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nuclear waste, Senator W. Sterling Cole, the Chairman of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, stated that the NRC was directed "to
impose standard regulations in connection with the use of the special
nuclear material and the utilization of the by-products." ' 7 The terms
"use" and "utilization" suggest a grant of authority to the NRC only
for technical concerns.
Nevertheless, the 1954 Act was basically silent as to what authority
the states had over the regulation of radiation hazards.,, In fact, some
states had begun to promulgate their own safety regulations by 1959.9

To clarify the division of federal-state responsibilities, Congress passed
the 1959 amendment 0° The legislative history of this amendment
suggests that the federal role is limited to the regulation of technical
matters.
The 1959 amendment allows the states greater participation in the
safe development of nuclear energy by permitting them to assume
some of the regulatory responsibilities of the NRC. 9' The NRC, which
proposed the amendment, realized that, as expertise in the nuclear
energy field became more prevalent, the states would "gain a greater
degree of competence through added technical resources."9 2 States
would be prohibited from regulating certain areas solely because the
technical safety considerations involved were considered to be too
complex for the states to handle, at least for the foreseeable future.13 A
later Congress noted that the NRC's authority to protect the "health
and safety of the public" was limited to the "special hazards" that are
associated with the operation of a nuclear facility. 94 The term "special
hazards" suggests a technological concern.
limited, as the bill contemplates, to those areas in which the Commission does have
special competence or responsibility.").
87. Id. at 11,659.
88. See Federal-State Cooperation, supra note 42, at 3-4.
89. Id. at 4-5. As of late 1958, seven states (California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas) had issued comprehensive
safety regulations. Twenty-two more states had regulations of narrower scope. Fifteen states required registration of radiation sources. Id. at 5.
90. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(4) (1976). This subsection states that one of the purposes
of the section is "to establish procedures and criteria for discontinuance of certain of
the Commission's regulatory responsibilities with respect to byproduct, source, and
special nuclear materials, and the assumption thereof by the States." Id.
92. Letter from A.R. Luedecke, General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission,
to Senator Anderson, Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (May 13, 1959),
reprintedin 105 Cong. Rec. 8383 (1959).
93. H.R. Rep. No. 1125, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959) (quoting letter from A.R.
Luedecke, General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission, to Senator Anderson,
Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (May 13, 1959), reprinted in 105
Cong. Rec. 8383 (1959)); S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959) (same),
reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2872, 2874.
94. H.R. Rep. No. 567, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1965); cf. New Hampshire v.
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170, 174 (1st Cir.) (Congress was concerned in
1954 with the "special hazards of radioactivity."), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
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A reading of the legislative history of the AEA and its amendments,
therefore, indicates that the "exclusive" authority of the NRC relates
only to the technical measures to be taken to protect against radiation
hazards. A state ban on the transportation of nuclear waste is, if
anything, distinctly non-technical. It does not seek to impose any new
standards on the transportation of waste. Rather, the state is attempting to decide whether to allow nuclear waste shipments; it is not
dictating how these shipments should be carried out. 96 If a state were
to ban only certain types of safety packaging, it would be dictating
which technical safety measures the shippers could use. 97 Such a ban
would be invalid. On the other hand, a non-discriminatory, total ban
of all highway shipments of nuclear waste, which by its nature requires no technical expertise, avoids preemption by the AEA.
Intensive federal regulation of an area is another factor that may
dictate a finding of implied preemption.9 Undoubtedly, federal regu-

95. See 1959 Hearings, supra note 74, at 494, in which the following dialogue
appeared:
Senator Hickenlooper. Let me ask you this: Suppose a plant wants to locate
adjacent to a city and the city says there is a radiation hazard and, "We will
not tolerate it near this city." The Commission says, "There is no radiation
hazard. We will locate the plant next to the city." Do we take away from
the city? That is what we do here-we take away from the city the right to
determine that fact.
Representative Price. I do not think we would. You would honor the zoning
regulations of any State.
This indicates that Congress intended to permit the states to retain their non-technical authority, such as zoning power. Thus, if there is any exclusive authority in the
NRC, it is exclusive only as to technical matters. This view is strengthened by the fact
that the NRC does not have exclusive authority over the transportation of nuclear
materials. It shares its regulatory authority with the Department of Transportation
(DOT). Trosten & Ancarrow, Federal-State-LocalRelationships in Transporting
Radioactive Materials: Rules of the Nuclear Road, 68 Ky. L.J. 251, 257-58 (19791980). In a Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the NRC and DOT on June 8,
1979, the NRC stated that its own authority over such transport applies only to the
"administrative, procedural, and technical requirements necessary to protect the
public health and safety." Transportation of Radioactive Materials; Memorandum of
Understanding, 44 Fed. Reg. 38690, 38690-91 (1979) (emphasis added).
96. Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983) (AEA allows the state to decide whether to
permit the construction of nuclear reactors); 1959 Hearings, supra note 74, at 494
(state may make zoning regulations prohibiting construction of nuclear plants);
Wiggins, FederalismBalancing and the Burger Court: California'sNuclear Law as a
Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C.D. L. Rev. 3, 61-67 (1979) (how nuclear plants are
constructed and operated has been preempted, but whether they should be constructed is a state decision).
97. Some state statutes, permitting the state to selectively choose which shipments of nuclear waste to allow, see supra note 13 and accompanying text, would be
invalid under this analysis. Selecting one type of safety measure as permissible while
stating that another is not would be a technical decision.
98. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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lation in this area has been pervasive. 9 Nevertheless, while the pervasiveness of federal regulations is a factor to be considered, it is not
sufficient to cause preemption. 10 0 Modern legislation often involves
areas requiring intricate and complex regulations from Congress. The
fact that Congress must enact comprehensive legislation because of
the nature of the regulated field does not mean that its enactments
were intended as the exclusive means of meeting the problem. 10' Thus,
especially considering that the technical nature of the nuclear field
demands a high level of intricate regulations,102 mere pervasiveness
cannot settle the question of the extent of the preemption.
The need for uniformity has been asserted as another ground for
finding an implied preemption. 0 3 A total ban on the shipment of
nuclear waste does not, however, disrupt the uniformity of the safety
regulations promulgated by the NRC. A ban prohibiting all highway
transportation of nuclear waste regardless of the protective measures
employed will not force carriers to use additional safety measures that
are not required elsewhere. 0 4 If entry into the state depended on the
99. The NRC regulations can be found in 10 C.F.R. pts. 0-199 (1983). They
include standards for domestic licensing, id. pt. 2, debt collection procedures, id. pt.
15, human uses of byproduct material, id. pt. 35, the packaging of radioactive
material for transport, id. pt. 71, and the granting of patent licenses, id. pt. 81.
100. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359-60 (1976) (comprehensiveness of
regulations of immigration and naturalization cannot, without more, be read as
preempting state regulation of aliens); New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973) (mere comprehensive nature of federal work
incentive program insufficient to support claim of preemption).
101. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359 (1976) ("[C]omprehensiveness of legislation . . . was to be expected in light of the nature and complexity of the subject.");
New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973) ("Given
the complexity of the matter . . . a detailed statutory scheme was both likely and
appropriate, completely apart from any questions of pre-emptive intent.").
102. See Rep. C. Holifield, Remarks for Presentation to the Annual Meeting of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science (Dec. 30, 1957), reprinted in
Federal-State Cooperation, supra note 42, at 504-05.
103. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
104. Cf. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179 (1978) (tug-escort
requirement and resultant additional cost for vessels not meeting state design standards does not force compliance with those standards); Huron Portland Cement Co.
v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960) (municipal ordinance for smoke emissions which
would require structural changes in federally licensed vessels does not disrupt national uniformity because there was no showing it actually conflicted with other local
ordinances); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1937) (state may not impose
particular standards as to structure and design of vessels beyond those that are
essential to safety and seaworthiness). Thus, the uniformity requirement is only
breached if the state action forces compliance with state measures that conflict with
the measures of other states. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520,
527, 529 (1959) (conflicting state requirement as to type of mudguard); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 771-72 (1945) (state law prohibiting longer trains
that were used outside the state); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 489 (1877) (conflicting
state requirement as to the seating of the different races on a river vessel).
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types of safety precautions employed, the ban would be open to attack
on the basis of the need for national uniformity.' 0 5 The shipper would
be forced to choose either to use the protective measures permitted by
the banning state, or to be precluded from shipping through that
state. If other states required different safety measures, national uniformity would be disrupted. A total ban that does not consider the
protective means used, however, would not be preempted on this
ground.
4. Frustration of Objectives
Absent an implied preemption, the question arises whether such a
ban would frustrate the objectives of Congress in passing the AEA.' 06
A ban on the transportation of nuclear waste would seriously hamper
the growth of the nuclear industry in this country.'0 7 Although the
general purpose of Congress may be to promote the use of nuclear
power, that goal is not meant to be achieved "at all costs." 0 8 A
statement of general purpose does not demonstrate a congressional
intent to preempt any state action that might hamper the achievement
of that purpose.' 0 9
Congress itself has provided the means by which a state may defeat
the general objectives of the AEA. For example, a state could prevent
the development of nuclear power plants by means of stringent land
use requirements, 1 0 or by using the authority granted to the states
under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.111 Because a state could

105. Cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 527, 529 (1959) (state
permitted trucks with contoured mudguards to enter, but not those with straight
mudguards); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 782 (1945) (state allowed
only trains with a maximum length of 70 cars to enter, while most other states
permitted trains with more than 70 cars).
106. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
108. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4043, 4048 (U.S. Jan. 10,
1984) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1731 (1983)); 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1976) (atomic
energy should be developed and utilized only to the extent it is consistent with the
health and safety of the public).
109. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 633 (1981). In Commonwealth Edison the Court found that the congressional objective of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (Supp. V 1981) to
'encourage and foster the greater use of coal," id. § 8301(b)(3), did not reflect an
intent to preempt all state action having an adverse impact on the use of coal. 453
U.S. at 633; see Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133-34 (1978)
(Sherman Act's basic national policy favoring free competition is not a congressional
decision to preempt all state authority to enact laws conflicting with that policy).
110. See supra note 95. See In re Consolidated Edison Co., 7 N.R.C. 31, 34

(1978).

111. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7416, 7422 (Supp. V 1981).
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prevent the operations of nuclear facilities in these other legitimate
ways, 1 2 it is not rational to single out a ban on nuclear waste transportation as the one way that frustrates the objectives of Congress.
These arguments demonstrate that Congress has not clearly and
unambiguously expressed its intent to preempt the traditional state
police power in this area."13 A ban on the highway transportation of
nuclear waste is a non-technical regulation, and there is at least some
doubt as to whether the states' authority over non-technical regulations of radiation hazards has been preempted. In addition, section
2021(g) suggests that a state may be able to engage in some form of
technical regulation. 114 These ambiguities lead to the conclusion that
the courts should uphold this exercise 5of the police power until Congress asserts itself with more clarity.1"
B. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the Hazardous
Materials TransportationAct
Two other federal statutes must be considered for their preemptive
effect. A close examination
shows that neither can be considered as
6
preemptive authority."

112. See In re Consolidated Edison Co., 7 N.R.C. 31, 34 (1978) (state could
prevent or halt construction or operation of nuclear facility for some valid reasons
under state law without conflicting with the AEA).
113. In addition, a court might not even reach the question of the extent of federal
preemption of nuclear safety concerns. States clearly have the authority to regulate
non-radiation hazards. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1726 (1983); Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem.
Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 580 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 469 (1982); S. Rep. No.
870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprintedin 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2872,
2882. The question of preemption is only over the extent of the states' authority to
regulate radiation hazards. At least one federal court has recognized the difficulty in
distinguishing what is or is not a regulation of a radiation hazard. Illinois v. KerrMcGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 581 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 469
(1982). The ban under consideration exemplifies this difficulty. The states would not
be trying to regulate the nuclear materials themselves, but rather the transportation
of those materials. They would not be regulating how the radiation source should be
transported, but would be forbidding that transportation out of concern for the
dangers of radiation. It is not totally clear that such a ban would actually constitute a
regulation of a radiation hazard. Cf. 1959 Hearings, supra note 74, at 494 (city's use
of its zoning laws to prevent locating a nuclear power plant next to the city based on
the claim that there is a radiation hazard is not a regulation of a radiation hazard).
114. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
116. An argument might be raised that the cumulative effect of all three statutes
evinces a congressional intent to preempt. This argument would be based on the
claim that preemption exists because of the pervasiveness of the federal occupation of
the field. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. In a field as technically complex
as nuclear power, however, a high degree of federal regulation is to be expected. See
supra note 102 and accompanying text. Thus, the mere pervasiveness of the regula-
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The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) was created to provide
much-needed disposal facilities for the ever-growing amounts of nuclear waste. 117 While the NWPA does not address the states' right to
ban totally the transportation of nuclear waste,"" it does expressly
state that it should not be construed as affecting any state or local law
"pertaining to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel or high-level
radioactive waste." l9 In the face of this section, a finding of a congressional intent to preempt cannot be justified. Furthermore, the
NWPA gives a state broad power to prevent the existence of nuclear
waste disposal facilities within its borders.' 20 Thus, a state ban on the
transportation of nuclear waste would not frustrate the objectives of
Congress, because Congress already allows the states to play a major
role in the success or failure of the nuclear waste disposal program.
The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA)' 21 provides
that any state regulation inconsistent with either the statute or the
regulations issued under its authority will not be preempted if (1) the
level of protection provided by the state is equal to or greater than the
protection from the federal requirement and (2) the state regulation
does not burden commerce unreasonably. 2 2 Although a state ban on
the transportation of nuclear waste may be considered inconsistent
with the statute,' 23 it may avoid preemption by meeting the two-part

test.' 2 4 A total ban would satisfy the first requirement because ban-

tions is not sufficient to justify a claim of preemption. See supra notes 100-01 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, the NWPA should not be included in causing a
cumulative effect, because it expressly denies affecting any state or local law with
regard to the transportation of nuclear waste. See infra note 119 and accompanying
text.
117. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
118. See Pub. L. No. 97-425, § 9, 96 Stat. 2206 (1983) (current version at 42
U.S.C.A. § 10,108 (West 1983)).
119. Id.
120. Id. § 115, 96 Stat. 2217 (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 10,135 (West
1983)). A state may submit a notice of disapproval of a proposed nuclear waste
disposal site to Congress. Id. § 116(b) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 10,136(b)
(West 1983)). If Congress does not pass a joint resolution within 90 calendar days of
continuous session approving the site, the site shall be disapproved. Id. § 115(c)
(current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 10,135(c) (West 1983)); see H.R. Rep. No. 491, pt.
1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3792,
3813.
121. Pub. L. No. 93-633, 88 Stat. 2156 (1975) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1812 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
122. Id. § 112(b), 88 Stat. 2161 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1811(b) (1976)).
123. 49 C.F.R. pt. 177 app. A (1982) states that a state routing rule applying to
large quantities of radioactive materials is inconsistent with 49 C.F.R. pt. 177
(regulations promulgated under the authority of the HMTA) if it prohibits the
transportation of such materials by highway without providing for an alternate
route.
124. In City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir.
1983), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 52 U.S.L.W. 3630 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1984),
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ning the waste prevents it from causing any harm in the state at all.
The second part of the test requires the same analysis as that employed
under the commerce clause. If the state ban survives scrutiny under
25
the commerce clause, it will not be preempted by the HMTA.1
II.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE

The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate commerce
among the states. 126 This grant contains no explicit restraint on the
authority of the states to exercise power over commerce in the absence
of congressional action. 127 Some areas, however, are not proper
spheres for the exercise of state authority.12 8 Even in the face of
congressional silence, the commerce clause prohibits a state from
erecting barriers to the free flow of interstate commerce. 2 9 This is
30
known as the "dormant" or "negative" side of the commerce clause.
New York City attempted to have the DOT regulations promulgated under the
HMTA declared invalid. Id. at 739. Such a result would have allowed New York City
to ban all transportation of nuclear waste without contravening the HMTA because
there would not have been any conflicting DOT regulations. Id. at 737. The court
held, however, that the DOT issuance of such regulations was within the authority of
the agency. Id. at 740. The HMTA does not require the DOT to promulgate regulations embodying the highest degree of safety. Id. This decision, however, does not
mean that all statutes imposing bans are invalid. It means only that a state cannot
claim that such bans are consistent with the HMTA. Rather, a state, to avoid
preemption, will have to travel the more difficult route of attempting to qualify
under the two-part test. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
125. See infra pt. II.
126. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
127. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (residual power in
state to make laws governing matters of local concern even though interstate commerce is affected); accord Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662,
669 (1981) (same); J. Nowak, supra note 22, at 266; L. Tribe, supra note 22, § 6-2, at
320; see Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976) (state has
broad power to protect public health despite an effect on the free flow of commerce);
Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 58 (1915) (state may protect safety and welfare of
the people, although the state measures incidentally affect interstate commerce). In
addition, the tenth amendment emphasizes that the state is permitted to exercise any
legislative powers not delegated to the federal government. U.S. Const. amend. X;
see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976); Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124
(1941); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251, 254-55 (1908); 2 C. Antieau, supra note 33,
§ 10:37, at 75.
128. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350
(1977) (overriding requirement of a national "common market"); Great Ad. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 375 (1976) (national interest in freedom for
interstate commerce); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 444
(1960) (state regulation may not stand if it disrupts required uniformity of interstate
commerce).
129. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
130. J. Nowak, supra note 22, at 267; B. Schwartz, supra note 29, at 126; L.
Tribe, supra note 22, § 6-2, at 320.
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Because Congress has not clearly preempted a state's authority to
exercise its police powers to erect a ban against the transportation of
nuclear waste,13 1 it must be determined whether such an action would
violate the "negative" side of the commerce clause.
The police power of a state does not rest upon any commercial
power, interstate or otherwise. Rather, it is founded on the recognition that there are some areas of legislation, such as "the preservation
of health, prevention of crime, and protection of the public welfare,"
that can best be implemented by the state. 132 The Supreme Court has
recognized, however, that state legislation protecting those concerns
may result in a burden on interstate commerce. 33 In such a situation,
the courts are left with the duty of drawing a line between a permissi34
ble and an impermissible burden on commerce.
Due to the special nature of a state's police power, the courts grant
it broad deference, particularly if the safety purpose is connected with
the use of state highways.135 Such regulations are granted a "strong
presumption of validity" even in the face of an argument that the
regulation burdens interstate commerce. 36 Alternative ways will not

131. See supra pt. I.
132. The License Cases, 46 U.S. 504, 631, 5 How. 504, 632 (1847) (Grier, J.,
concurring); see 2 C. Antieau, supra note 33, § 10:2, at 6; B. Schwartz, supra note
29, at 52, 129.
133. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978); Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 523-24 (1959); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,
531-32 (1949); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1915); 2 C. Antieau, supra
note 33, §§ 10:39-:40, at 82-84; see B. Schwartz, supra note 29, at 128.
134. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1978); Great
At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); B. Schwartz, supra note 29, at 128.
135. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443-44 (1978); Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 523 (1959); Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949); accord Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,
450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981); see 2 C. Antieau, supra note 33, § 10:40, at 83; B.
Schwartz, supra note 29, at 130-31.
136. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959); accord Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443-44 (1978); Washington State Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983). The general test for validity of state regulations not involving
the exercise of the states' police power was announced in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970). The Pike test requires that the state action regulate in an evenhanded, non-discriminatory manner to serve a legitimate local purpose while having
only an incidental effect upon interstate commerce. Id. at 142; see Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). If the state regulation meets this requirement, it will
be upheld provided the resultant burden on interstate commerce is not "clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. The extent
to which a burden on commerce will be tolerated depends upon the type of'legitimate local interest involved, and upon whether that purpose could be served by a less
burdensome alternative. Id. A different test is employed when the local interest seeks
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be sought to achieve the state's goal. 137 Still, "the incantation of a

safety does not insulate a state
purpose to promote the public health or
13
law from Commerce Clause attack."'
The Supreme Court's most recent attempt to formulate a test addressing state restrictions on the use of its highways arose in Kassel v.
ConsolidatedFreightways Corp.'39 Unfortunately, this plurality decision resulted in not one, but three possible tests. These tests, however,
all share some basic points. First, they require that the.regulation, to
be upheld, must be non-discriminatory. 140 For example, a state's attempt to ban the transportation of nuclear waste into, but not within,
the state would be unconstitutional.1'1 No matter how salutary the
state's purpose, it "may not be accomplished by discriminating against
articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is
some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently."142
Obviously, the places of origin of the nuclear waste have no effect on
the radioactive hazards posed by such materials. "4 Therefore, to
withstand the commerce clause challenge, a state must ban the shipment of nuclear waste originating inside, as well as outside, its borders.

to protect the public health and safety. See infra notes 139-83 and accompanying
text.
137. -Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 449-50 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959); see
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R.,
393 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1968); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros.,
303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938).
138. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981); accord
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978).
139. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
140. See id. at 675-78 (Powell, J., plurality opinion); id. at 687 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 692 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
141. Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d
627, 631 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983); Illinois v. General
Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983).
142. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978); see, e.g.,
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1977)
(North Carolina law invalid that imposed an additional cost on Washington, but not
on North Carolina, apple shippers); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366, 375 (1976) (only state interests of substantial importance could validate a
discriminatory state law relating to sale of out-of-state milk); Dean Milk Co. v. City
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (discriminatory state exercise of its power to
protect public health and safety invalid if reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives
are available).
143. Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1982) ("However
compelling the state's interest in safeguarding its residents from the hazards of
radioactivity, that interest is unaffected by the origin of the radioactive material."),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983).
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Secondly, all three views in Kassel provide that the safety benefits
sought to be achieved must be more than mere illusion.144 Whether a
particular state can actually show a safety benefit as a result of the
ban necessarily depends on the specific facts, such as the population
density, terrain and road conditions of each state. 145 This factual issue

may be the greatest obstacle in the way of the ban. The commercial
transportation of even highly radioactive materials has an excellent
safety record.' 4" In 1981, the Department of Transportation issued a
report concluding that "the public risks in transporting these materials
by highway are too low to justify the unilateral imposition by local
governments of bans and other severe restrictions on the highway
mode of transportation.' 147 The casks in which this waste is packaged
are constructed under stringent safety requirements, 48 and tested
extensively by such means as dropping them 2000 feet onto the desert
9
floor. 14

Congress, however, in passing the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, recognized that while the hazards incident to nuclear waste disposal are
small in theory, "[i]n practice, . . . management of nuclear wastes has
been inadequate to guarantee that the risks will be small in fact."' 5 0
This caution seems justified in the light of some incidents, such as one
in which a canister of "radioactive material" fell off a truck and was
not found until twelve hours later. 151 Because a finding of an actual
144. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981) (Powell,
J., plurality opinion); id. at 681 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 692 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (quoting Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 449
(1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
145. Cf. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346, 349-50,
355 (1953) (state may force railroad to enlarge grade separations that cause traffic
problems in rapidly growing city, despite material interference with interstate commerce); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 195-96
(1938) (conditions under which state highways are constructed are not uniform
throughout the country, and thus a state legislature is not bound by the judgment of
other legislatures as to the burden those highways can withstand); Nashville, C. & St.
L. Ry. v. White, 278 U.S. 456, 459 (1929) (state requirement to have a flagman at
railroad crossings, despite presence of electric signal, cannot be said to be unnecessary and unreasonable when those crossings are constantly travelled).
146. Inconsistency Ruling (IR-1), 43 Fed. Reg. 16,954, 16,957 (1978).
147. 46 Fed. Reg. 5299 (1981).
148. See 10 C.F.R. pts. 71, 73 (1983).
149. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1983, at A18, col. 1. Another test is placing the casks on
trucks and railroad cars, which are then crashed into concrete walls at speeds of 60 to
84 miles an hour. Id. These tests are designed to ensure that the casks will not
rupture. Id.
150. H.R. Rep. No. 491, 97th Cong., pt. 1, 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3792, 3796.
151. Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 25, 1983, at 8A, col. 1. While the cask did not
rupture, the danger still existed that somebody might pick it up. If somebody had
picked it up, according to Mike Mobley of the Tennessee Department of Health and
Environment, "it would be a very serious danger." Id; see Norton, Policy Issues in the
Routing of Radioactive Materials Shipments, 21 Nat. Resources J. 735, 739 (1981)
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danger would depend on the individual facts of each case, this Note
cannot make any definitive determination of the actual risks involved.
For the remainder of the Note, it shall be presumed that some safety
benefit exists. If, in an actual case, this safety benefit is not shown, 52the
benefit will be deemed illusory and the ban will be invalidated.
Beyond these common factors, the tests differ. The first test, proposed by Justice Powell, 153 recognizes the deference normally given to
state actions based on the police power. 54 The state action, however,
must first be analyzed to see if it is worthy of such deference. 155 If the
state action bears disproportionately upon out-of-state residents, less
deference will be afforded,' 5 and the Court will balance the safety
interest with the burdens on commerce.157 If such a balance is necessary, the measure will be invalidated if the safety benefit is only
marginal, while the burdens on commerce are substantial.' 58 If, however, such deference is granted and the safety benefits are not illusory,
the Court will not second-guess the state legislative judgment about
the importance of the safety purpose in comparison to the related
burdens on interstate commerce.1 59

(between January 1, 1978 and December 31, 1980, there were 289 reported incidents
of radioactive shipments in the United States emitting radiation in excess of the

permitted levels); Shapley, Radioactive Cargoes:Record Good but the Problems Will
Multiply, 172 Science 1318, 1318-19 (June 25, 1971) (quoting an official at the
United States Department of Transportation Office of Hazardous Materials as stating
that "someday some of these shipments will be involved in severe accidents").
152. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
153. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 664 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell was joined in the
plurality decision by Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens.
154. Id. at 670.
155. See id. at 678 (traditional deference was not given to the state judgment, thus
the controlling factors are the relative safety of the state regulation and the substantiality of the burden on interstate commerce). A state is granted this deference because
of the assumption that, if a state safety regulation does not on its face discriminate
against interstate commerce, the burden on the state's own economic interests will
guarantee that the political processes of the state will serve as a check on the passage
of any unduly burdensome regulations. Id. at 675; Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18 (1978).
156. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 675-76.
157. Id. at 671 & n. 12 (A state action is invalid if the safety interest is illusory and
the federal interest is significantly impaired. It is "highly relevant" to this balance
that the state action is not given the traditional deference.); see id. at 678 (when state
safety judgment does not merit traditional deference, the controlling factors are the
actual safety benefits and the extent of the burden on interstate commerce).
158. Id. at 670, 678.
159. Id. at 670 (quoting Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 449
(1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring)); see id. at 697 n.8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(reading the plurality opinion as holding that a state need only prove that the safety
benefits are not illusory, when the state action merits the "strong presumption of
validity").
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The first line of inquiry under the Powell test, therefore, is whether
the proposed state action has a disproportionate impact on out-of-state
residents. 60 A state's ban on the transportation of nuclear waste
would not have such an impact. The burden imposed on out-of-state
power plants by the ban would merely be the inconvenience of a
detour or of finding a new disposal site.' 6 1 For the in-state residents,
the burden is more onerous. A nuclear plant within a state might be
forced to shut down, because of the ban, when its on-site storage
facilities reach capacity. 162 The only means of avoiding such a result
would be either to have a permanent disposal facility located on the
same grounds as the power plant, or to use alternative means of
transportation, such as transport by rail or waterway. 163 If a state had
no nuclear facilities, the ban would still be burdensome, in that it
would at least strongly discourage, if not totally preclude, the possibility that the state could avail itself of a major energy source. Thus, the
would serve as
economic pressures caused within the state by the ban
64
the necessary political check on hasty state action.1
Thus, a ban would be given full deference. The Powell test would
then merely ask whether the safety benefit is illusory. 65 Assuming that
this benefit is non-illusory, 6 a ban would be upheld under this test.
The second approach, proposed by Justice Brennan, 167 rejects any
attempt at balancing in the field of safety regulations. 68 It is not the
province of the courts to second-guess the judgment of a state's lawmakers on the proper balance to be struck between competing inter-

160. See id. at 675-76. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
161. See Trosten & Ancarrow, supra note 22, at 287.
162. See id. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
164. Cf. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 676 (1981)
(political check lacking because state's "border cities" received the benefit of longer
trucks without the state accepting the burdens of interstate traffic). This rationale,
however, does not apply with equal force to a city or local ban on such transportation. The economic effect of a local ban upon the municipality would not be as harsh
as the economic effect of a state-wide ban upon the state. While a local municipality
may ban the transportation of nuclear waste within its borders, such a ban would not
prevent the construction of a nuclear facility within the state. Consequently, a city
would be able to have its proverbial cake and eat it too. The municipality could
prevent the transportation of nuclear wast through its streets, yet avail itself of the
energy generated by a nuclear plant located somewhere else within the state. Thus,
the normal deference to a municipal ban might not be accorded, and the municipal
ban would fail where a state-wide ban might succeed.
165. See supra notes 144, 159 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
167. 450 U.S. 662, 679 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan was joined in
his concurrence by Justice Marshall.
168. Id. at 681 n.1.
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ests. 169 Once the safety benefits are shown as not illusory or insubstantial, the courts should defer to the judgment of a state.170 The courts
17
should not weigh a safety interest against an economic interest. '
Under this analysis, however, "the local benefits actually sought to be
achieved by the State's lawmakers, and not ... those suggested after
the fact by counsel," must be considered.172 In other words, provided
a state's legislative intent was actually to promote the public health
and safety, and these safety benefits were not illusory, the regulation
is permitted to stand. 173 Thus, a ban having a non-illusory safety
benefit would be invalidated only if the state's legislative intent was
not to enact the ban for that safety purpose, but for some other
reason. If the state is sincere in its safety justification,
the ban would
74
withstand this commerce clause analysis.1
The third view, suggested by Justice Rehnquist, 7 5 also rejects any
balancing approach.' 76 Safety and economic interests are considered
too dissimilar to be able to make some vague claim that one "outweighs" the other. 17 7 Accordingly, Justice Rehnquist would automatically grant deference to any state action claiming a safety purpose. 178
Provided the safety measure is rationally related to achieving its purpose, the only other consideration is whether the safety justification is
merely a pretext for discriminating against interstate commerce. 179
This pretext is presumed to exist if the safety benefit is illusory. 18 0 If
the benefit is not illusory, however, the state action will be upheld.' 8 '
169. Id. at 686-87 (quoting Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,
449 (1970) (Blackmun, j., concurring)).
170. Id. at 681 n.1.
171. Id. at 681 n.1, 686.
172. Id. at 680.
173. See id. at 680-81 & n.1.
174. The language of Justice Brennan's opinion, however, hints that he might
invalidate some safety measures related to interstate commerce as being protectionist
in nature. See id. at 685. The decision of one state to protect its own safety interests at
the expense of the safety or other interests of other states is a form of safety protectionism, which would be invalidated just as economic protectionist measures are. Id.
at 686-87. As Justice Rehnquist points out, however, all safety regulations that affect
commerce are, by definition, "protectionist." Id. at 705-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's view would prevent a state from ever taking more stringent
safety measures than other states in areas that affect commerce. The states would
have to permit unsafe travel through their jurisdiction simply because some other
state permitted it. See id.
175. Id. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist was joined in his
dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart.
176. Id. at 698-99.
177. See id. at 691.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 692.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 697 n.8 (state needs only to show safety benefits are not illusory, and
that a rational relationship exists between the state regulation and safety).
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A ban is a rational means of protecting against the hazards incident to
the transportation of nuclear waste,1 2 and the benefit achieved by it
has been presumed not to be illusory. 1 3 Thus, the Rehnquist view

would not invalidate such a ban.
Under any of the three tests, therefore, it is likely that a nonillusory, non-discriminatory ban on the highway transportation of

nuclear waste would not be invalidated under the "negative" side of
the commerce clause. Considering the societal interest in the continued existence of nuclear energy, the question remains whether the
Court should develop a separate test for nuclear issues. For example,
should the existence of a less burdensome alternative,8 4 such as merely
restricting the transportation to certain quiet hours of the night, be
sufficient to defeat a state's regulation? Such an approach would deny

to a state legislature its accustomed deference. 8 5 As Justice Rehnquist

has pointed out, such a course would involve the judiciary in deciding
state policy.1 6 A court would be imposing its opinion on a state as to
what is the least burdensome way to protect the public health and
safety. 1 7 Such policy decisions, particularly in an area traditionally
within the states' domain, are not the proper function of the judiciary. 8 8 If any federal action is to be taken to restrict the states' authority in this area, that action should be taken by Congress.

182. Not permitting trucks carrying nuclear waste to enter the state is, to say the
least, an effective way of preventing any accidents involving the transportation of
that waste from occurring within the state.
183. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
184. The search for a less restrictive alternative exists in other areas of the law.
See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (while requirement of residency to
receive abortion in hospital within the state might be valid if policy was to preserve
state-supported facilities, it is unconstitutional when it applies to private hospitals);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (governmental regulation is valid
if the incidental restriction on first amendment freedoms is "no greater than is
essential" to further the governmental interest); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (A local statute plainly discriminating against interstate
commerce is invalid if "reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available.").
185. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
186. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 691 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("It would. . arrogate to this Court functions of forming public policy,
functions which, in the absence of congressional action, were left by the Framers of
the Constitution to state legislatures.").
187. See id. at 691-92.
188. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. &
Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 138 (1968) ("[P]ublic policy can, under our constitutional
system, be fixed only by the people acting through their elected representatives.");
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959) ("Policy decisions are for the
.. . legislature."); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
177, 190 (1938) ("[A] court is not called upon, as are. . . legislatures, to determine
what . . . is the most suitable restriction to be applied.
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CONCLUSION

Congress has not clearly preempted state police power to such an
extent that a state's total ban on the highway transportation of nuclear
waste within the state would be impermissible. Neither does current
commerce clause analysis of state exercises of the police power render
a non-illusory, non-discriminatory ban invalid. A state still retains the
authority to pass such a ban on the highway transportation of nuclear
waste. The validity of such a ban, however, would ultimately depend
upon the ability of a state to document the existence of the claimed
safety benefit.
This Note demonstrates that a state might legitimately prevent
nuclear waste from travelling through the state by means of motor
vehicles. This Note does not suggest that this is necessarily a desirable
course of action for a state to undertake. Should Congress consider it
undesirable for the states to possess this authority, then Congress, and
not the courts, should take steps to prevent the enactment of such a
ban.
ChristopherF. Baum

